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# Investor Protection in South East Asian BITs: A comparative Analysis of Model BITs of the ASEAN Countries

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#### **ABSTRACT**

This research paper provides a comparative analysis of investor protection within the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) of ASEAN countries. It examines key provisions like fair and equitable treatment (FET), expropriation clauses, and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. The analysis highlights differences in the approach to investment protection, balancing foreign investor rights with state sovereignty across countries such as Singapore, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Additionally, the regional ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) and its role in promoting investment are explored. The paper underscores the evolving nature of BITs in Southeast Asia to adapt to global investment trends. The laws of the host state and the investor's home country, the agreement between the host state and the investor, and the guidelines and precepts of international investment law are the three legal frameworks that apply to foreign investment. When interpreting an investment agreement or arbitrating a dispute, these three sources of law must be examined collectively since they interact with one another.

#### Introduction

Investor protection is a pivotal component in bilateral investment treaties (BITs), providing safeguards for foreign investors while promoting foreign direct investment (FDI). In the context of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprising ten member states, BITs serve as key legal instruments aimed at protecting investments, mitigating risks, and enhancing economic cooperation between states and foreign investors. This researchpaper delves into the scope of investor protection provided under the bilateral investment treaties of ASEAN countries. It presents a comparative analysis of the model BITs of these nations, illustrating the similarities and differences in their approaches to investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), fair and equitable treatment (FET), expropriation provisions, and other essential investor protection clauses. Specialized international investment agreements (IIAs), which regulate foreign investment matters with an emphasis on dispute-settlement processes, have emerged as a result of the expansion of global trade and investment. The majority of regional agreements and bilateral investment treaties contain clauses pertaining to host states and private parties.

This paper's main finding is that different nations' investment regulations serve different purposes. The purpose of an investment law in certain nations is to set up a procedure for evaluating and approving new investments. Some countries have many investment laws, while others have no investment laws at all. This reflects the range of potential purposes of an investment legislation. These fundamental functional questions are significant. Without first defining the purpose of the new investment legislation and taking into account how this connects to the functioning of existing investment-related laws, a law reform process cannot move forward[1-5].

# Methodology:-

The doctrinal methodology has been involves a structured examination of ASEAN member states' Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to assess investor protections. The study begins with a comparative textual analysis of the Model BITs of key ASEAN countries to identify common standards and unique national provisions. It involves

interpreting treaty provisions related to fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, and dispute settlement mechanisms. Key doctrines, such as sovereignty versus investor protection, are reviewed to assess regional trends and deviations. The research incorporates a comparative law approach, referencing BITs beyond ASEAN, to gauge influences from global standards. Finally, the study contextualizes these findings within the evolving ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) framework, evaluating its alignment with regional economic goals and global investment protection standards [1,22-26]

## 1. Scope of Application

Investment laws generally apply to both domestic and foreign investors. Foreign investors are distinguished by their non-resident status and are subject to specific provisions related to entry, ownership limits, and protection against discriminatory practices. The law applies to various forms of investments, including investment projects (direct investment in a business) and investment capital (financial contributions). It may also cover portfolio investments, which involve investing in securities, though the extent varies by jurisdiction.

#### 2. Investment Institution

Investment laws often create or refer to an investment institution or authority responsible for promoting and regulating investments. This institution typically facilitates investment approvals, monitors compliance with the law, and provides investor services. Its functions may include granting incentives, offering guidance to investors, and ensuring transparency.

#### 3. Entry and Approval of New Investment

The investment law usually specifies the process for admission and approval of new investments. This includes establishing a positive or negative list of sectors that are open or restricted to investment. Sectors requiring approval typically involve sensitive industries like defense or energy. Government agencies or investment promotion boards oversee these approvals, and the process is often linked to other permits such as environmental and construction permits.

#### 4. Relationship to Other Laws

Investment laws interact with other national laws, such as those governing immigration, taxation, and land acquisition. They may either defer to or override these laws in specific areas. Special provisions often exist for investments in Special Economic Zones (SEZs), where investors might benefit from tax holidays or simplified regulatory processes.

#### 5. Investment Incentives

Investment incentives may be granted on an automatic or discretionary basis. These include tax breaks, grants, or subsidies, typically tied to the nature and scale of the investment. The process for obtaining these incentives is often integrated with the investment approval process.

## 6. Investor Rights

Investment laws often confer rights related to expropriation (compensation in case of nationalization) and the ability to transfer capital and earnings abroad. These rights typically align with those found in bilateral investment treaties (BITs), offering protection against unfair treatment.

# 7. Dispute Settlement

Many investment laws establish mechanisms for resolving disputes through domestic courts or international arbitration. Some countries create specialized bodies to handle investment-related disputes, ensuring investors have a streamlined process for resolving issues.

# 8. Status of Investment Treaties

Investment laws sometimes address the role of investment treaties, allowing foreign investors to invoke treaty

rights in domestic courts. These treaties often provide additional protections and facilitate easier dispute resolution for international investors.

#### 9. Other Unusual Features

Certain investment laws may have unique provisions such as promoting outbound investments (investment by nationals in foreign countries) or regulating share trading in local stock exchanges. These features are designed to attract capital, boost economic activity, and integrate the local market with global financial systems[5,6,8].

#### Overview of ASEAN and BITs

Founded in 1967, ASEAN includes Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. The economic growth of ASEAN member states has attracted significant foreign investment, making investor protection a critical factor in regional development. As ASEAN member countries pursue independent economic policies, they also engage in both intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN BITs, influencing the region's overall investment climate.

BITs across ASEAN aim to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of foreign investors, protection against unlawful expropriation, and access to international arbitration for dispute resolution. However, the exact provisions vary, reflecting the distinct legal traditions and policy objectives of individual ASEAN states.[9,11]

## **Key Provisions in ASEAN BITs**

1. Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET)

FET is one of the cornerstones of investor protection in BITs. The FET clause ensures that foreign investors are treated in a manner consistent with fundamental principles of fairness and due process. However, the interpretation and scope of FET provisions differ among ASEAN countries:

**Singapore's Model BIT:** Singapore's model BIT emphasizes transparent and predictable legal frameworks. Its FET provisions align closely with international standards, providing foreign investors with a high degree of protection.

**Indonesia's Model BIT:** Indonesia's BITs offer a more restrictive interpretation of FET, aiming to balance investor protection with state sovereignty. The FET clause in Indonesian treaties often references customary international law, leaving room for varied interpretation by tribunals.

**Vietnam's Model BIT:** Vietnam adopts a moderate stance, providing FET provisions that protect against discriminatory or arbitrary treatment, while emphasizing state rights to regulate in the public interest.[16]

## 2. Expropriation Clauses

Expropriation provisions in BITs are designed to protect foreign investors from the unlawful seizure of their assets by the host state. In ASEAN, expropriation clauses differ in how they define both direct and indirect expropriation: **Thailand's Model BIT:** Thailand provides strong protection against direct expropriation, requiring that any expropriation must be for a public purpose, conducted in a non-discriminatory manner, and accompanied by prompt and adequate compensation.

Malaysia's Model BIT: Malaysia adopts similar protections but goes further to include indirect expropriation, where regulatory actions by the state, although not outright seizures, diminish the value of an investment.

**The Philippines' Model BIT:** The Philippines' BITs provide detailed definitions of indirect expropriation and stipulate that any expropriation must align with international law. Compensation is determined by the fair market value of the expropriated asset.

# 3. Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)

The ISDS mechanism allows foreign investors to bring claims against the host state for breaches of investment treaties. ISDS provisions in ASEAN BITs have evolved over time, reflecting a mix of pro-investor and state-centric approaches:

Brunei's Model BIT: Brunei adopts a traditional ISDS approach, allowing investors to bring claims directly to international arbitration without requiring the exhaustion of local remedies. This provision aims to enhance

investor confidence by offering direct recourse to arbitration bodies such as ICSID or UNCITRAL.

**Indonesia's Model BIT:** Indonesia has moved towards limiting ISDS provisions. In recent treaties, Indonesia has introduced exhaustion of local remedies as a prerequisite for international arbitration, aiming to protect national sovereignty and reduce frivolous claims.

**Vietnam's Model BIT:** Vietnam adopts a middle-ground approach. Its BITs provide ISDS mechanisms while also encouraging amicable settlement of disputes through mediation before resorting to arbitration[11,17,18,20].

## Comparative Analysis of ASEAN Model BITs

## 1. Approach to Investment Liberalization

ASEAN BITs vary in their approach to investment liberalization. Countries like Singapore and Malaysia, with more liberalized economies, adopt BITs that are highly favorable to foreign investors, offering strong protections and minimal restrictions on foreign ownership. On the other hand, countries like Indonesia and Myanmar have historically adopted more cautious approaches, with BITs that reflect a need to balance foreign investment with national development objectives.

## 2. Scope of Coverage

BITs of Brunei and Thailand typically provide broad definitions of investments, encompassing not only tangible assets but also intellectual property rights, contractual rights, and shares in companies. In contrast, Laos and Cambodia adopt narrower definitions of investment in their BITs, focusing more on tangible assets and direct equity participation.

#### 3. Treatment of Environmental and Social Issues

In recent years, many ASEAN countries have started incorporating environmental and social clauses in their BITs. Vietnam's BITs often emphasize sustainable development and explicitly recognize the state's right to regulate in environmental matters, ensuring that investor protection does not come at the cost of environmental degradation. Similarly, Malaysia has introduced provisions aimed at protecting labor rights and encouraging corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices in its newer BITs.

## 4. Performance Requirements

Performance requirements refer to obligations placed on foreign investors, such as local content requirements or technology transfer. Indonesia and Vietnam have historically imposed more stringent performance requirements on foreign investors, especially in sectors deemed critical for national development, such as mining and telecommunications. In contrast, Singapore and Brunei have fewer performance requirements, focusing on attracting high-quality FDI without imposing restrictive conditions.

# 5. State Sovereignty vs. Investor Protection

The balance between protecting state sovereignty and ensuring investor protection is a common theme across ASEAN BITs. Countries like Indonesia and Thailand have revised their model BITs in recent years to prioritize state sovereignty, particularly in sensitive areas such as public health, natural resources, and national security. This has led to the inclusion of clauses that allow states to regulate without breaching BIT obligations, known as "right to regulate" provisions. On the other hand, Singapore and Malaysia have maintained a more pro-investor stance, with fewer restrictions on investor rights and greater recourse to international arbitration[1,19,20].

# Regional Investment Agreements: ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA)

In addition to individual BITs, ASEAN member states are also parties to the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA), a regional treaty aimed at promoting intra-ASEAN investment and offering protection to

investors from member states. The ACIA builds on the principles of national treatment, most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, and the free transfer of funds, but it also includes provisions that allow states to impose temporary restrictions during times of economic crisis.

The ACIA's investor protection mechanisms are less comprehensive than those found in the BITs of more developed ASEAN countries like Singapore and Malaysia. However, the ACIA plays a critical role in facilitating regional investment flows and provides a common legal framework for investor protection across the region.

ACIA promotes a liberal, facilitative, transparent, and competitive investment environment within ASEAN. Its main objectives are to:

- Foster an open and competitive market for investment.
- Protect investment and provide a secure legal framework for investors.
- Facilitate free movement of capital and investments across the region.

#### ACIA rests on four pillars:

- Liberalization: Gradually removing restrictions and prohibitions on investments.
- Protection: Ensuring non-discriminatory treatment and protecting investors against unlawful expropriation.
- **Promotion**: Encouraging greater cross-border investments and capital flows.
- Facilitation: Reducing regulatory barriers, simplifying procedures, and improving transparency.

ACIA provides a robust mechanism for the resolution of investment disputes, including state-to-state and investor-to-state dispute settlements, ensuring investor protection under international arbitration frameworks.

## **Challenges in Investor Protection in ASEAN**

While ASEAN BITs provide robust frameworks for investor protection, they are not without challenges. Disparities in legal systems, levels of economic development, and political stability across ASEAN countries affect the implementation of BIT provisions. Furthermore, the rise of ISDS cases against ASEAN governments has led to growing concerns about the impact of investor protection on state sovereignty. This has prompted some countries, such as Indonesia and Thailand, to revisit their BITs and seek a more balanced approach to investor protection and state regulatory space[2,3,9,22].

# Conclusion

Investor protection in Southeast Asian BITs reflects the diverse economic, legal, and political landscapes of ASEAN member states. While countries like Singapore and Malaysia offer strong protections to foreign investors, others like Indonesia and Vietnam have adopted more cautious approaches, balancing the need for foreign investment with domestic development goals. The evolution of BITs in ASEAN is marked by an increasing recognition of the importance of state sovereignty and the right to regulate, particularly in areas such as environmental protection and public health.

A comparative analysis of ASEAN model BITs reveals a range of approaches to key investor protection issues such as FET, expropriation, and ISDS. As ASEAN continues to grow as a major hub for FDI, the challenge will be to strike the right balance between attracting foreign investment and ensuring that national development objectives are met. Moving forward, ASEAN countries may continue to refine their BITs, drawing lessons from past experiences and evolving international norms in investment protection.

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