
The impact of international crises on us-turkish relations 1957-1964 ad Presentation

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Introduction:

This study examines the international crises that affected US-Turkish relations after World War II.

US-Turkish relations have been tested on a number of issues that have left both sides with questions about the political intentions of the other. During the Cold War, the alliance's goal was clear: forming a common front against the Soviet Union. However, this did not prevent relations from being exposed to crises, represented by a number of crises, the most important of which are:

The Syrian crisis of 1957, the Lebanese crisis of 1958, the Iraqi crisis of 1958, the Cuban crisis of 1962, the coup of 1960, the Cyprus crisis.

This study consists of:

Introduction, six elements, conclusion, and list of sources and references.

First: The Syrian Crisis 1957-1958.

Second: The Lebanese Crisis 1958.

Third: The Iraqi Crisis 1958.

Fourth: The Coup of 1960

Fifth: The Cuban Crisis 1962

Sixth: The Cyprus Crisis.

Conclusion: In it, the most important results reached by the researcher were monitored.

The researcher used a set of published and unpublished documents, a number of Arab and foreign references, and periodicals that helped clarify the ambiguity of some points of the study.

First: The Syrian Crisis in 1957-1958 AD

Between 1957 and 1958, Syria's relations with the West deteriorated due to its violent opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine and its close proximity to President Nasser's policies, at a time when Syria's relations with the Soviet Union had come to an unprecedented halt in the history of relations between the two countries. This rapprochement coincided with the Syrian government's announcement that it had discovered an American conspiracy against it, which resulted in its decision to expel a number of American diplomats in Damascus for. Their connection to that conspiracy⁽¹⁾

(1) Governor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Film No. 15, Portfolio No. 18, File No. 758, 81, 3, 10/7/1957, regarding a memorandum on political relations between Syria and Jordan.

- Ismail Sabry Muqallid, The American-Soviet Conflict over the Middle East, Regional and International Dimensions, Dhat Al-Salasil Publications, Kuwait 1406 AH - 1986

This prompted the United States to confront Syria. Some sources commented that the United States was preparing an aggression against Syria and called for the immediate thwarting of the American conspiracy, which was based on the invasion of Turkey and Iraq into Syria. It was said that the plan required Iraq to intervene later under the pretext of saving Syria from the Turkish aggression, while Israel launched an attack to distract the Syrian army. This crisis embodied Moscow's launch of an organized campaign against the Arab countries and Turkey that lasted three months. The Soviet government issued a stern warning to Adnan Menderes, threatening him with a Soviet invasion of Turkey if it carried out any military operations against Syria.⁽²⁾

After the Turkish elections, the Turkish escalation towards Syria increased, while the Soviets began to issue threats towards the Turks, which prompted Dallas to use Turkey to enter Syria.⁽³⁾

While Turkey completely sided with the American position hostile to Syria and repeated the same American allegations and claims and added to them of its own, the Turkish government announced the existence of a leftist government controlled by the Soviet Union, but these allegations were denied by the Soviets and described as a mere smokescreen behind which Western attempts were hiding, which used Turkey as a spearhead to invade Syria and overthrow its ruling regime. In the midst of this extremely critical situation, the Turkish government issued a statement on September 11, 1957, in which it rejected the Soviet accusations that it was preparing for a military invasion of Syria.⁽⁴⁾

Thus, the United States found that the circumstances did not allow it to carry out an operation to uproot the ruling authority in Damascus after it found an official and popular Arab climate that was completely hostile to such provocative military measures. This was the reason that made the American Secretary of State Dulles declare on September 10, 1957 that there was no longer a need to implement the Eisenhower Doctrine, and that the United States would focus on solving its problems with Damascus through peaceful means.

However, as soon as the Syrian-Turkish border crisis began to calm down relatively, tensions escalated again when it was announced in Damascus in early October 1957 that the Soviets had proposed to the Syrian government to grant them the right to establish a naval base in Latakia. Khrushchev made a statement on that occasion that if the United States had incited Turkey to wage war against Syria, the Soviet Union would not remain a spectator. Once again, Khrushchev accused Turkey of amassing huge forces on its border with Syria at a time when it had evacuated its border with the Soviet Union of its military forces. This prompted Abdel Nasser to transfer Egyptian forces to Latakia on October 13, 1957, to cut off all possibilities that the situation was threatening in Syria, especially since the tension that had erupted again due to the continued Turkish mobilization on the Syrian border threatened to explode the situation in a way that was difficult to predict the consequences of this time.

As a result of this crisis, Abdel Nasser's view was that since the American threat to Syria could be thwarted, its rush towards the Soviet Union necessitated the establishment of an Egyptian-Syrian unity to confront the influence of the communists in Syria.⁽⁵⁾

Thus, the extent of the positive impact of the Syrian crisis on US-Turkish relations became clear, as the extent of Türkiye's connection to the United States became clear.

•Second : The Lebanese crisis of 1958 AD

US-Turkish relations have been tested on a number of issues that have left both sides with questions about the other's political intentions. During the Cold War, the alliance's goal was clear: to form a common front against the Soviet Union. However, this did not prevent relations from experiencing serious crises.

AD, p. 156

(2) Walter Lacour, Soviet Union, Commercial Office Publications, for Printing, Distribution and Prose, Beirut, 1959 AD, p. 282-285.

(3) Richard Good. Adams, John Foster Dulles, (A Reappraisal), Appleton, Century - Crofts, INC, New York, 1962, P.253

(4) Ismail Sabry Muqallid, op.cit, pp.158- 159

(5) Ismail Sabry Muqallid, op.cit, pp.160- 161

(6) Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey in Search of a New Dress: The Challenge

In May 1958, signs of a devastating political crisis began to appear in Lebanon with the armed civil war that erupted as a reaction to the Western-friendly policies pursued by Lebanese President Camille Chamoun and his Foreign Minister Charles Malik, who was known for his extremist American tendencies.

This position angered the national forces in Lebanon, which strongly ⁽⁷⁾opposed Lebanon falling into the arms of the West

At the same time, the wave of revolutionary tidal waves moved from Baghdad to Beirut, which caused this country to enter into a civil war, which prompted the Lebanese leadership to seek the help of American forces so that it would not meet the same fate as the former Iraqi ⁽⁸⁾regime

In mid-July 1958, Washington agreed to Lebanon's request and sent some forces from the Sixth Fleet to the Mediterranean, in addition to some forces in Europe, which immediately arrived at the Turkish air base of Incirlik near Adana. The movement of American forces from the Incirlik base affected the American situation in Turkey at that time, as the American movement from the Incirlik base was based on a mere statement addressed to the American authorities for its forces and not on the basis of discussions with the Turkish authorities. Although the Menderes government was unable to provide an explanation for this American position, the opposition criticized the Menderes government, accusing the United States at the same time of violating Turkey's sovereignty because the American forces moved on Washington's orders ⁽⁹⁾and not on Ankara's orders

The Turkish government responded to these accusations by saying that the United States was defending its broad interests, which was of primary concern to Ankara. On the other hand, the United States' use of the air base in Ankara brought American and European correspondents to cover this matter, and these journalists moved with American forces and came very close to very sensitive locations, while Turkish journalists were refused entry to the base, which Turkey considered unequal ⁽¹⁰⁾treatment

As a result, an anti-American movement spread in the Turkish press, at a time when the Turkish press was getting its information from the ⁽¹¹⁾American press

These events led the opposition to call for two extraordinary sessions of Parliament in July and August 1958 to discuss this issue, but no steps ⁽¹²⁾were taken against the United States

Since the Menderes regime supported the United States even in the darkest moments of 1958, the July meeting that brought together Türkiye and its allies in the Baghdad Pact gave its approval for the entry ⁽¹³⁾of American forces into Lebanon

As a result of this crisis, Turkey's three allies moved towards inviting the United States to join the Baghdad Pact to obtain full membership, but Washington rejected this again, but promised in a joint statement at the end of July 1958 that it would negotiate with each member of the alliance to enter into a bilateral agreement with it to confirm American support and assistance. This meant that the United States signed an agreement with Türkiye on March 5, 1959, called the Cooperation Agreement⁽¹⁴⁾

Thus, it became clear that the Lebanese crisis had an impact on the US-Turkish relations. The Turkish newspapers and forces opposed to the US presence in Turkey attacked the US interference in Turkish affairs and opposed the use of the Incirlik base by US forces to attack Lebanon. On the contrary, the official position of the Menderes regime, which was fully supportive of the United States, was such that Menderes became one of the most

Facing Both Europe and the United States, translated by Fadhel Janker, Al-Obeikan Library, Saudi Arabia, 1422 AH, 2001 AD, p. 377

(7) Ismail Sabry Muqallid, op.cit , pp.166- 167

(8) C f. George S, Harries , *The causes of the 1960 Revolution in Turkey , Middle East Journal , 1970, P.67.*

(9) I bid

(10) George S. Harries, op. cit, P.67

(11) I bid, 68

(12) I bid

(13) I bid

(14) I bid

important pillars in the Middle East on which the United States relied to implement its policy in that region.

Third : The Iraqi crisis 1958 AD.

After the 1958 coup, the United States' fears of the potential dangers of the Iraqi revolution to its interests and the interests of its Western allies in that region began to diminish after the leadership of the revolution pledged to maintain the spirit of cooperation between them and the United States.

However, American fears were reactivated after the revolutionary government announced in March 1959 its decision to officially withdraw from the Baghdad Pact Treaty.⁽¹⁵⁾

A meeting of the three remaining regional states in the Baghdad Pact was held immediately after the coup, which resulted in completely unrealistic proposals for military action by the United States and Britain, but the response was not encouraging.

Then I woke up and felt that I was going to leave Iran and I was born in an extreme state of mind..⁽¹⁶⁾

In general, this crisis did not have a significant impact on US-Turkish relations.

Fourth : The coup of 1960 AD

In early 1960, the internal political situation in Turkey was deteriorating sharply, at a time when the Menderes government was unable to control it, prompting the army to carry out a coup on May 27, 1960, which overthrew the ruling regime represented by the Democratic Party, which was headed by Menderes, who was one of the extremist Turkish politicians who defended the policies of alliance with the West, and played the major role in including Turkey in the NATO and Baghdad Pact, and replaced it with a military government headed by General Cemal Gürsel, who held the position of Chief of Staff. ⁽¹⁷⁾

One of the reasons that led to the coup in Türkiye was the violation of constitutional traditions, the spread of chaos and unrest in the country, and the involvement of the army in politics..⁽¹⁸⁾ The economic situation worsened as a result of the Menderes government's economic policies, which led to a trade and balance of payments deficit, rising prices, and the flight of foreign capital..⁽¹⁹⁾

Following the national elections in October 1961, the Republican People's Party won 173 seats, while the Justice Party won 158 seats. As no party had an absolute majority in parliament, it became inevitable to form a coalition government. This government was formed by the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party, and İsmet İnönü became Prime Minister. ⁽²⁰⁾

The foreign policy of the coalition government stipulated the following:

"The basis of our foreign policy is to implement the slogan of peace at home and peace in the world." It also announced its continued orientation towards the West and the United States and its commitment to all the agreements and alliances it signed with them, especially NATO". ⁽²¹⁾

The new government decided to refer Menderes to trial on charges of political corruption. He was convicted and executed, which was a shock to American policy in Turkey, which lost one of its main pillars of influence in the

(15)Ismail Sabry Muqallid,op.cit , p.173

(16)Philip Robins, Türkiye and the Middle East, translated by Mikhail Najm Khoury, 1st ed., Madbouly Library, 1993,pp.36-37

(17)Ismail Sabry Muqallid,op.cit , p.192

(18) Ahmed Nouri Al-Naimi, Türkiye and the Arab World, Academy of Graduate Studies and Research, Tripoli, 1998, p. 166

(19) Amira Mohamed Kamel El-Kharboutly, The Political Role of the Military in Türkiye, Unpublished Master's Thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 1972, p. 134.

(20) Ahmed Nouri Al-Naimi, Türkiye and NATO, published PhD thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Science - Cairo University, 1981, p. 166

(21)Ahmed Nouri Al-Naimi, Türkiye and NATO,p. 160

Middle East with his death..⁽²²⁾

The American politician Mr. Dinkfort Ruston pointed out that the relations that linked Turkey to the United States had cooled after the May 1960 coup. Cemal Gursel stated in a press conference held on September 17, 1960 that it was now time to reconsider the Turkish-American agreement regarding the deployment of NATO forces in Turkey.⁽²³⁾

Some minor military leaders, such as Major Muzaffer Ozdag, also showed hostility to foreign activities in Turkey. Most of the foreign activities that did exist were American. Orhan Kahli, a member of the 1960 coup, pointed out that Turkey had become an American colony, an accusation that was refuted by most commentators who felt sympathy for the United States..⁽²⁴⁾

But it appears from the writings of many Turkish researchers and journalists, as well as from the memoirs of the participants in the 1960 coup, that the desire to change the course of Turkish foreign policy, especially towards the West and America, did not come from conservatives or from the likes of Cemal Gursel and the army generals in the National Unity Council. Rather, these initiatives were launched by radical officers. ⁽²⁵⁾

One researcher confirms that the Turkish officers' emphasis after the 1960 coup on their commitment to all alliances with America was not due to their love for the United States and NATO, but rather to their fear of American military intervention.⁽²⁶⁾

The Western countries and the United States recognized the new regime in Turkey on May 30, 1960, and President Eisenhower sent a letter to President Cemal Gursel, the leader of the coup movement, on June 11, 1960, which stated:

“The declaration of their government's close association with NATO and SNATO has given me, as well as our other allies, a feeling of gratitude, since these alliances exist only to defend the free world. My government will strengthen the bonds of friendship with your government, for this friendship has long been a mainstay between our two countries.”

There was no radical change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Western blocs during this period. This is evident from the statement of Selim Sarper, the Turkish Foreign Minister at the time, who said, “We have announced since the morning of May 27, 1960 our ties to NATO and that our goals are not to undermine it. From the first moments, we have resisted all trends that called for creating a special status for us in NATO.”⁽²⁷⁾

As a result of the 1960 crisis, the labor movements became active and expressed themselves through gatherings and demonstrations that later took on a mass character. The workers' demands were to improve their living and working conditions, and they held hostile tendencies towards the relationship with America and NATO. Leftist ideas emerged among them that expressed their interests directly, which increased their activity and crystallized leftist thought among them. ⁽²⁸⁾

It is worth noting here that the 1961 constitution recognized for the first time in Turkey's history the leftist movements, and the latter demanded the cancellation of Turkey's treaties with the West and the establishment of relations with neutral and socialist countries. In fact, the recognition of the leftist movements in Turkey is considered a revolution in the history of Turkish foreign policy, and this recognition resulted in a cooling of

(22)Ismail Sabry Muqallid,op.cit , p.192

(23) ibid

(24) George.S. Harries, op. cit, P.87

(25)Ismail Sabry Muqallid,op.cit , p.192

(26)Youssef Al-Jahmani, Turkey and America (From Multipolarity to the Unipolar System), Dar Juran for Printing and Publishing, 1st ed., Damascus, 2000 AD, p. 20

(27)Ahmed Nouri Al-Naimi, Turkish Foreign Policy after World War II, unpublished MA thesis, Library of Economics and Political Science - Cairo University, 1973 AD, p.1610162

(28) Youssef Al-Jahmani, p. 20-21

relations between Türkiye and the United States.⁽²⁹⁾

The Turkish national question was a very important and sensitive issue for the National Unity Council, and for all Turks, which also concerned the privileges and immunities enjoyed by Americans within Turkey. At the same time, the military leaders had a desire to make a change to reduce the number of discontented people. After assuming power, they formed a ministerial council whose task was to determine the scope of American personal military service.

In the midst of developments, an incident occurred that imposed a kind of change on the case. In May 1961, an American official at the Turkish Sinob base was accused of shooting a Turkish guard, as American eyewitness testimony accused the soldier. Although some newspapers tried to calm the situation, the military council personally intervened to insist on further investigation. However, these efforts did not lead to any results. In July 1961, the state of frustration that afflicted the Turks was confirmed by reports confirming the involvement of the Americans in the incident. However, American officials believed that the American soldier was not on duty at the time of the incident, and this did not reduce the severity of the issue in the eyes of public opinion.

The Turkish interest in imposing restrictions on the privileges enjoyed by Americans within Turkey did not mean that the Turkish rulers intended to attack the set of bilateral agreements with the United States, but this issue was the opposite..⁽³⁰⁾

Fifth : Cuban Crisis October 1962

The Cuban crisis proved Türkiye's loyalty to the United States, as it announced that it would stand by the United States in its crisis with the Soviets, known as the Cuban crisis. .⁽³¹⁾

At the end of 1957, NATO ministers agreed to deploy medium-range nuclear-tipped missiles. The Menderes government was the only one enthusiastic about having this type of missile on Turkish soil. Despite Soviet opposition to this project, the Ankara government prepared to receive the Jupiter missiles.

In October 1959, the United States and Turkey signed an agreement to deploy the Jupiter missile fleet in Turkey. At the end of 1959, the Turks determined the locations of the missiles outside Izmir. Although Foreign Minister Ftin Rustu had promised the parliament in January 1956 that he would be responsible for informing it when an agreement was reached, the Democratic Party government did not disclose these understandings..⁽³²⁾

However, these missiles were not installed until 1961 AD; however, in the spring of 1962 AD, these missiles became operational and were delivered to the Turks on October 22, 1962 AD, in the midst of the Cuban crisis (). Despite the United States installing Jupiter missiles on Turkish territory, the American administration and President Kennedy initially refused to install these missiles on Turkish territory (). However, it was the Soviet intransigence to withdraw the Soviet missiles from Cuba that prompted the United States to establish an American missile base in Türkiye..⁽³³⁾

On October 26 and the morning of October 27, 1962, the White House received two letters from Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev. In the first letter, he acknowledged the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba and offered to withdraw them from the Cuban island.

The second speech presented that the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba was linked to the withdrawal of American missiles from Turkey, and in addition the Soviet Union pledged not to invade Turkey if the United States made a similar pledge linked to Cuba..⁽³⁴⁾

(29)Ahmed Nouri Al-Naimi, *Turkish Foreign Policy after World War II*, op.cit , pp. 164-165

(30) George.S. Harries, op. cit, PP. 87-88

(31) Robert F. Kennedy. op. cit , P.93

(32) George.S. Harries, op. cit. P.92

(33) Major problems In American foreign Relations (Documents and Essays) , vol II , Kennedy and Excom on trading the Jupiter Missiles In Turkey, October 27,1962, PP.489-491

- Major problems In American foreign Relations (Documents and Essays) , vol II , the Mashall plan (Economic cooperation Act 1948) , PP. 261-262

(34) Thomas G. paterson and J Garry clifford and Kenneth , Vol 2 , J. Hagan,

However, in the spring of 1961, the United States had proposed withdrawing the Jupiter missiles, but no agreement was reached on this matter with Turkey. However, the Turkish military leadership considered the presence of these missiles on its territory to be important for protecting its security.⁽³⁵⁾

In a NATO Council meeting in the spring of 1962, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk raised this issue with Turkish officials, but it was put aside. With the continued Turkish opposition to withdrawing these missiles from its territory, this issue was put aside.

Faced with this situation, President Kennedy refused to trade Turkey for Cuba. In his response to Khrushchev's letter dated October 27, 1962, he indicated that he had ignored the offer presented in the second letter, but had agreed to the offer presented in the first letter, which referred to Turkey. ⁽³⁶⁾

As the Cuban crisis developed, it had a profound impact on US-Turkish relations. Some believe that Turkey played a major role in the events at a time when NATO countries in particular and Scandinavian countries in general were merely spectators of the events. Neither the Ankara government nor Turkish public opinion was prepared to enter into a severe conflict with the Soviets. This role created a feeling that the danger of war might appear without any warning. This feeling of fear began to grip a large number of Turks. The Cuban crisis and its development made Turkey believe for the first time that merely possessing these types of weapons made Turkey a prime target for Soviet attack. As a result, the Turks began to feel the desire to remove the weapons system that the Soviets considered a source of danger in order to reduce the possibility that the country would enter into a conflict against its will. The Inonu government asked the United States to agree to withdraw the Jupiter missiles, and in mid-1963 the missile bases were completely removed from Turkey.⁽³⁷⁾

On the one hand, on the other hand, the Turkish leadership was very interested in modernizing its air force, in order to strengthen its military forces, and the Turks seized the opportunity to pressure Washington to deliver more modern aircraft, in light of the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles, and it was clear that the demise of the medium-range missile system was a prominent sign in Turkey's transformation and the transformation of its strategic importance. ⁽³⁸⁾

It is clear from the above that the Cuban crisis highlighted the extent of the United States' connection to Turkey and Türkiye's loyalty to the United States by standing with the United States in its conflict with the Soviets.

American foreign Relations (Ahistory since 1895) , Hughton Mifflin company , Boston , undated , P.330

- Tomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill, major problems In American foreign Relations since 1917, vol II, D.C.Heath and company, lixington, 1987,PP. 489-491

(35) L. Carl Brown , Diplomacy in the Middle East (the international Relations of regional and out said powers) , I.B. Touris , publishers , London, undated , P.265

(36) Frenc A vali, op. cit, P.128- 129

(37) George.S. Harries, op.cit, P.94

(38) George.S. Harries, op.cit, P.65

Sixth : Cyprus crisis

The Cyprus crisis was ⁽³⁹⁾One of the most important crises that affected US-Turkish relations .⁽⁴⁰⁾

Cyprus played an effective role in preventing Russia from approaching the Mediterranean or the Middle East through Britain defending Turkey within the framework of the Anglo-French Turkish Agreement signed in 1939, and the NATO Agreement in 1951. However, with the end of World War II, Britain became unable to carry out its duties towards protecting Turkey and the Middle East.⁽⁴¹⁾

The United States' intervention in the Eastern Mediterranean and its replacement of Britain after World War II was due to two things, and one of them must be chosen:

First: Either the United States accepts the responsibility placed on its shoulders to replace Britain in defending Turkey, Greece and Cyprus.

Second: Confronting the dire consequences of resisting Soviet pressure through areas close to the Middle East and large parts of Western Europe.

For this reason, the United States took upon itself Britain's responsibility in Cyprus. However, despite this, American policy supported Britain in the direction of the Cyprus crisis during the fifties, but it changed this direction in the early sixties (). However, it took upon itself to deal with the problem in a more flexible manner that served its interests.⁽⁴²⁾

The main reason for the emergence of sectarian conflict in Cyprus is due to the offer made by King Paul of Greece in 1947 to the British governor to establish a union with Cyprus. Although Britain rejected this proposal, Makarios announced in 1950 that 95% of Cypriots preferred union with Greece. Then secret organizations were formed to

(39)cyprus: Cyprus is located in the eastern part of the Mediterranean basin, 50 miles from Turkey and 700 miles from Greece, its area is 3572 square miles, and the island is divided into two conflicting sects, 80% of its population speaks Greek and professes Greek Orthodox Christianity, 18% speaks Turkish and professes Islam, 2% of Armenian minorities and others, the cultural presence of the Greeks in Cyprus dates back to the early ages of history, and Cyprus was subject to many invasions, and was administered by the Phoenicians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Ottomans, and the English. The presence of the Turkish-speaking community in Cyprus dates back to 1571 AD with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The Turks ruled Cyprus until 1878 AD when the island was left to the British on a lease, then the British took over when the Ottoman Empire participated in World War I against the British, and in 1925 AD the British turned Cyprus into a British colony. With foreign control over Cyprus, the issue of conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots was not raised until the first half of the twentieth century. After the development of the situation on the island, Britain was forced to grant the island independence in 1959 AD in partnership with Greece and Turkey according to the Treaty of Zurich in 1959 AD and London in 1960 AD.

- Theodore coulombis, op.cit, P. 27-29

(40)Ahmed Nouri Al-Naimi, Turkish Foreign Policy after World War II,op.cit ,p. 180

(1) Brenda'o Malley and Ian Craig, the Cyprus consiparcy (America, Espoinage and the Turkish Invasion, I.B Touris publisher , London,1999, P.4

(42)Adel Mohamed Zaki, National Unity in Cyprus, unpublished PhD thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Science - Cairo University, 1980, pp. 438-439.

join Greece, which prompted the Turkish Cypriots to announce their opposition to this union before the United Nations General Assembly, in addition to their demand to divide the island, of which they constitute 18% of the population, between them and the Greek Cypriots.⁽⁴³⁾

The British stated that Cyprus was one of their internal affairs and not within the jurisdiction of the United Nations arbitration. In the midst of the conflict involving Britain against Greece and against Turkey, the United States took the side of Turkey and Britain. The United States voted in the United Nations in favor of Britain and Turkey in the fifties, which created a kind of Greek resentment toward the United States.⁽⁴⁴⁾

The United States worked to prevent Greece from raising the Cyprus issue to the United Nations and instead worked to find a solution for it within the framework of NATO, while the Greeks preferred to solve their problem within the framework of the United Nations due to their feeling of marginality in NATO.⁽⁴⁵⁾

By 1955, Turkish groups supported by the Menderes government attacked the Greek minorities in Istanbul and Izmir. The extent of the destruction was great, so the Athens government ordered the return of the Greek forces operating in Izmir under the NATO force. At the same time, the American position met with negative reactions in Greece, so the American Secretary of State sent a letter to both countries (Greece and Turkey) advising them to reform their policy. This was followed by the United States voting in the United Nations against the inclusion of Cyprus on the agenda of the nations in the fall of 1955.⁽⁴⁶⁾

After four long years of conflicts on the island of Cyprus, the conflicting parties reached a satisfactory settlement, and it was reached outside the framework of the United Nations, so that the Zurich and London agreements signed in February 1959 came to regulate the relationship between the two sides within Cyprus in addition to regulating the relationship of Cyprus with Britain, Turkey and Greece, as it was pursuant to which the independence of Cyprus was declared in August 1960.⁽⁴⁷⁾

Although the Zurich and London agreements were the basis for declaring the independence of Cyprus and regulating the relationship between the Greek and Turkish sides within Cyprus, they were the reason for the outbreak of incidents between the two communities and the tension in relations between Turkey on the one hand and Greece and Cyprus on the other.⁽⁴⁸⁾

By 1960, there was a shift in American policy towards the Cyprus crisis. The events that resulted from the 1960 coup and the revival of the Turkish left after 1960 cast their shadows on American-Turkish relations and on the Cyprus issue and the United States' position on it, as previously mentioned in the 1960 crisis.⁽⁴⁹⁾

The United States' interest in the Cyprus problem has given it a new dimension, as it has become a general problem of concern to the major powers after it had been a local problem in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The United States considered Cyprus to be one of the regions of great strategic importance, and it has tried to include it within the scope of its military influence, taking into consideration that it is its most important strategic location, and its suitability in the long term for establishing a base for supplying ships and aircraft during any limited or comprehensive war that occurs in any region.⁽⁵⁰⁾

The Cyprus incident of 1963 had an impact on Turkey's foreign policy and on US-Turkish relations. The Cyprus issue involved two NATO members, Turkey and Greece, but the alliance was unable to resolve the dispute, and

(43)Jalal Yahya and Muhammad Nasr Mahna, *The Cyprus Problem*, Dar Al-Maaref, Cairo, 1981 AD, p. 196.

(44) Theodore A. Coulombis, *op. cit*, P.28

(45) *Ibid*

(1) Theodore A. Coulombis, *op. cit*, PP.28-29

(47)Jalal Yahya and Muhammad Nasr Mahna,*op.cit* , p. 196

(48) *ibid* .

(49)Ahmed Nouri Al-Naimi, *Turkish Foreign Policy after World War II,op.cit* ,p. 186.

(50) Thanaa Fouad Abdullah, *Greece's Foreign Policy Towards NATO During the Period of Military Rule (1967-1974)*, Unpublished PhD Thesis - Cairo University, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, p. 514 .

the efforts of the United Nations were of no avail .⁽⁵¹⁾

Relations between Turkey and Greece were normal before the outbreak of events in Cyprus, but these relations did not last long as a result of President Makarios' decision to amend the 1960 Constitution on January 1, 1964. Following this, Ismet Inonu, who was then the head of the Turkish Ministry, stated:

"This decision violates the Zurich and London Treaties and Turkey will take upon itself the protection of the Turks on the island." He added, "Turkey does not resort to military intervention before consulting and discussing with the guarantor states of international agreements."⁽⁵²⁾

In January 1964, the London Conference was held, attended by Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders, along with representatives from Britain, Turkey and Greece. Following this, the three countries appealed to the United Nations to intervene in order to resolve this issue peacefully. At the same time, Britain sent a military unit to reinforce its forces in Cyprus.⁽⁵³⁾

At Turkey's request, the NATO Permanent Council met in The Hague in May 1964. The NATO Council instructed the NATO Secretary General to make good offices to ease the war between Greece and Turkey over the island of Cyprus. The NATO Secretary General stated: All NATO member states believe that the governments of Greece and Turkey should support the mediation of the United Nations in Cyprus, and that the two governments should realize that the dispute between them places the Alliance in a dangerous position in a vital region for it.

In a statement by the NATO Council, the member states referred the Cyprus issue to the United Nations.⁽⁵⁴⁾

The US policy position did not differ from that of NATO, considering that the United States was the one that founded the alliance and invited countries to join it. This is clearly evident from the statement of US President Johnson's envoy to Ankara in February 1964 that he agreed with President Inonu that consultations and exchange of views should take place between the two countries (Turkey and the United States) and he reiterated NATO's decision to resolve the Cyprus issue. William Fulbright, a member of the US Congress, stated during his visit to London and who was assigned by the US President to investigate the facts between Turkey and Greece, "It is important that the violence in Cyprus ends, but that is not part of his mission. Rather, his program focuses on the NATO countries' attachment to this issue."⁽⁵⁵⁾ After a meeting between Fulbright and the British Prime Minister, it was reported that the US State Department had begun to support the Greek point of view on the Cyprus issue. Fulbright visited Turkey and met its Prime Minister, and assured the latter that the US Congress looked with concern at America's allies and friends who were concerned with their own affairs and did not care about peace in the Western world. He pointed out that the United States had proposed the deportation of the Turkish population present on the island in order to maintain peace and security in the Mediterranean basin. This request caused great concern in Turkish circles, who responded to Fulbright that the solution they saw was the separation of the Turkish part from the Greek part, and this would cancel its division.⁽⁵⁶⁾

The Soviets agreed with the Turkish position, as the Soviets became increasingly concerned about American interference in the Cyprus issue, as they considered that America aimed to achieve its interests and the presence of NATO forces inside the island in order for NATO to have military control over the island .⁽⁵⁷⁾

Following this, Inonu, the Prime Minister of Turkey, visited Washington in May 1964 and met with President Johnson. After the talks were concluded, a joint statement was issued stating: "The two parties support the strengthening of the efforts made by the United Nations to restore peace and security on the island, and affirm

(51)Hamdi Hafez, *Contemporary Global Problems*, Cairo, National House for Printing and Publishing, 1966, pp. 450-460

(52)ibid

(53)Hamdi Hafez,op.cit, 450-460

(54) Jalal Yahya and Muhammad Nasr Mahna, *The Cyprus Problem*, Dar Al-Maaref, Cairo, 1981 AD, pp. 200-201.

(55)Ahmed Nouri Al-Naimi, *Turkish Foreign Policy after World War II*,op.cit ,p.190

(56) Hakasut, *Cyprus 1946 - 1968* , factson file New York , 1970 , P.8

(57) I bid

their respect for all existing agreements binding on the signatories.”⁽⁵⁸⁾

In mid-March 1964, clashes between the Turkish and Greek communities were renewed. In late March, the Cypriot House of Representatives issued a decision calling on men to serve in the National Guard to establish an armed force. However, Vice President Makarios objected to this decision, which prompted Makarios to declare that the 1960 Constitution was no longer valid and that his vice president was no longer a deputy. Following this, the Turkish Prime Minister stated:

“My country will protect the Cypriot Turks if their rights cannot be maintained by peaceful means and the international measures currently being taken, and the aforementioned recruitment decision is contrary to the Zurich and London agreements. Following this, the Cypriot forces were put on high alert to confront the Turkish fleet which was stationed at Alexandretta, 120 miles from Cyprus.”⁽⁵⁹⁾ At the time when the Soviet Union announced its support for Cyprus in the event of a Turkish invasion.⁽⁶⁰⁾

As a result, on June 3, 1964, the United States warned Turkey against invading Cyprus, and President Johnson invited the prime ministers of Turkey and Greece to Washington. However, Turkish public opinion was not satisfied with this invitation because they considered it a conspiracy by the United States to prevent them from intervening to protect the Zurich and London Treaties.⁽⁶¹⁾

At the same time, the United States informed both the Turkish and Greek governments that the US government would take certain measures to prevent a war between two NATO member states.⁽⁶²⁾

In response to Turkey's decision to intervene in Cyprus, Johnson sent a letter to Ismet Inonu on June 5, 1964. The letter focused mainly on the commitments towards NATO and that intervention in Cyprus would lead to a war between Turkey and Greece, which would contradict the decision to include the two countries in the alliance and their commitments towards that. He gave the example of ending the hatred between Germany and France for joining the alliance, and demanded the same between Turkey and Greece. He warned that Turkey's intervention would give the Soviet Union the opportunity to intervene in Cyprus, and the situation would be very difficult as NATO countries would then not be obligated to defend Turkey.⁽⁶³⁾

In evaluating Johnson's letter to Inonu in 1964, it can be said, in addition to the previous considerations, that American-Turkish relations have gone through a period of decline and have reached their lowest point.⁽⁶⁴⁾ This letter was considered a turning point in US-Turkish relations since World War II.⁽⁶⁵⁾

Many things that were hidden from the Turkish public opinion were revealed, including the bilateral agreements that Turkey signed with the United States, which numbered 55 agreements concluded during Menderes' rule. Most of these bilateral agreements were ^{secret and were} not announced to the Turkish public opinion, and some of them were signed in accordance with Article 3 of the NATO Treaty.

Others fell outside the alliance, and Turkish public opinion began discussing these agreements in the newspapers, which led to the spread of hostility to the American presence in Turkey and demands to remove military bases

(58) H.D. Purcell , *Cyprus , Ernest Benn limited , London , 1969, P.346*

(59)Ahmed Nouri Al-Naimi, *Turkish Foreign Policy after World War II,op.cit ,pp. 192-193*

(60) Ahmed Othman, *History of Cyprus (Island of Beauty and Pain from Antiquity to the Present Day)*, Faculty of Arts, Cairo University, 1997 AD, p.235

- Brendano' Malley and Ian Craig , *op. cit*, P.61

(61)Jalal Yahya and Muhammad Nasr Mahna, *op.cit*, p. 204.

(62) *ibid*

(63) Jamil Abdullah Muhammad Al-Masry, *The Present of the Islamic World and its Contemporary Issues*, 1st ed., Al-Ubaikan Library, n.d., p. 618

- Doc on Middle East , President Jonson's letter to prime Minister Inoun, June 5, 1964, P.128

- Millet Lerarsi Múnasebetler , *op. cit* , P. 23

(64) Jalal Yahya and Muhammad Nasr Mahna, *The Cyprus Problem , pp.207-208*

(65)Jamil Abdullah Muhammad Al-Masry,*op.cit* , 618

from Turkish territory and the outbreak of anti-American demonstrations, where demonstrators attacked the US consulate. This led the US government to amend these agreements to satisfy Turkish public opinion, and among these fundamental amendments to these agreements is that the United States does not take any action without the knowledge of the Turkish government. ⁽⁶⁶⁾

Another result was that the United States reduced the number of Americans on Turkish soil from 27,000 to 7,000, and the military airports and American radars were transferred to the Turkish Armed Forces, while new principles were established for the other bases. ⁽⁶⁷⁾

It is worth noting here that the means of launching nuclear weapons in the American units stationed in Turkey became at the disposal of the Turkish Armed Forces, with the exception of the air base in Adana (southern Turkey), where the latter was equipped with American short-range aircraft equipped with nuclear warheads. According to NATO defense plans, these aircraft were not placed under the command of the Turkish army, but rather were placed directly under the Supreme Command of the Allied Forces in Europe. ⁽⁶⁸⁾

As a result of American pressure on Turkey, it decided to back down from its decision to use the Turkish armed forces to invade Cyprus, as Prime Minister Inonu indicated in his letter to the American President on June 13, 1964, that the Turkish government had decided to postpone its military intervention in Cyprus. ⁽⁶⁹⁾

In addition to this, Turkey's fear of entering into a war with Greece was one of the reasons that prevented it from taking the decision to invade Cyprus because it saw that it would lead to their expulsion from NATO and thus the denial of American aid to them. ⁽⁷⁰⁾

Ismet Inonu pointed out that the invasion of Cyprus by the Turkish armed forces was scheduled for June 4, 1964, but the day before that day, Washington warned against invading the island because this would provoke the Soviets. ⁽⁷¹⁾

While the United States rejected Turkish military intervention in Cyprus, the Soviets supported Greece and the Greek Cypriots. ⁽⁷²⁾

However, at the same time, after the Cyprus crisis, Türkiye began to develop its relations with the Soviets. ⁽⁷³⁾ This is a result of the American policy towards the Cyprus crisis, which was based primarily on the factor of giving priority to the interests of NATO and making that above all other considerations. ⁽⁷⁴⁾

From the above, it is clear that the Cyprus crisis had a negative impact on US-Turkish relations, such that this crisis is considered a turning point in US-Turkish relations since World War II.

Conclusion :

This study reached a number of results, which were as follows:

- The Syrian crisis of 1957-1958 AD revealed the extent of American penetration into Turkish decision-making circles and directing them towards serving American interests in confronting Soviet influence in Syria.

(66)Jalal Yahya and Muhammad Nasr Mahna, *op.cit* , 207

(67)ibid , p. 208

(68) ibid , p. 209

(69) Doc on the Middle East , Prime Minister Inonus Response to the president, June 13,1964, P.30

(70) Robert Stephens , *Cyprus Aplace of arms (Power politics and Ethnic conflict In the Eastern mediterranean* , pall mall press, London , 1966, P.157

(71) Charles Foley and W.I. sobie, *struggle for Cyprus*, Hoover Instituion press, stam ford, 1975, P.163

(72) Robert O. Freedman, *soviet policy toward the middle East since 1970*, prager publishers , New York , 1978, P.18

(73) Joseph L.Nagee and Robert H.Donaldson , *soviet foreign policy since world war II*, pregman press, New York , 1981 , 173

(74)Thanaa Fouad Abdullah, *op.cit*, p.516.

- The Lebanese crisis had a negative impact on US-Turkish relations, as Turkish newspapers and forces opposed to the US presence in Turkey attacked US interference in Turkish affairs and opposed the use of Incirlik base by US forces to attack Lebanon. On the contrary, the official position of the Menderes regime, which was fully supportive of the United States, was such that Menderes became one of the most important pillars in the Middle East on which the United States relied to implement its policy in that region.
- The Iraqi crisis did not play a major role in influencing US-Turkish relations as a result of Iraq's loyalty to the United States after the 1958 coup.
- The 1960 coup did not change the course of Turkish policies towards the United States and the West as a result of the Western military alliances that linked Türkiye to them.
- The Cuban crisis in 1960 proved the extent of the United States' connection to and loyalty to Turkey by standing by its side in its conflict with the Soviets in Cuba and allowing the United States to use its military bases in Turkey to confront the Soviets.
- The Cyprus crisis had a negative impact on US-Turkish relations, as it was considered a turning point in relations between the two countries since World War II, as a result of the US position in support of Greece in Cyprus.